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PLATO'S UNWRITTEN DIALECTIC OF THE ONE AND THE GREAT AND SMALL
In the present paper I wish to deal with certain main points in the 
Unwritten Doctrines of Plato, which are detailed in the reports of Aristotle 
on these teachings, which reports must have been based on Aristotle's own 
memories and notes of what Plato actually said in the seminars or 
which he and many others attended, and which are further elucidated by the 
many ancient commentators on the writings of Aristotle, such as Alexander, 
Simplicius, Philoponus, and Syrianus, as well as by a most valuable anti-Platonic 
polemic of Sextus Empiricus in the Tenth Book of his treatise Against the 
Mathematicians. Aristotle, the Aristotelian commentators and Sextus Empiricus 
put it beyond all doubt that Plato had an important body of Unwritten Doctrines 
which were only inadequately adumbrated in the Dialogues, but which can none the 
less be advantageously used to illuminate very many passages in the Dialogues, 
and particularly some in the Republic, the Timaeus, the Parmenides and the 
Phi Tenus. In my book Plato: The Written Unwritten Doctrines and in my shorter
book Plato and Platonism, I have tried to use the material touching the Unwritten 
Doctrines to illuminate the written Dialogues, and in the former work I have 
also provided a translation of much of this material, which brings together 
much of this material, which is otherwise widely scattered. I do not consider 
that anyone can rightly interpret Plato's written work who neglects to consider 
the light thrown on it by the reports of the Unwritten Doctrines. These reports 
are in many ways enigmatic, and have had, moreover, a very indirect, equivocal 
influence on subsequent philosophy. The Neoplatonists made comparatively little 
use of them, though their stress on the One as the Supreme Hypostasis in their 
Absolute, and their identification of it with the Socratic-Platonic Good, plainly 
derives from this source. The Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, including Aquinas, 
were content to repeat Aristotle's reports and censures with little attempt
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either to understand or evaluate them, while the Nineteenth Century followed 
Schleiermacher in basing all accounts of Platonic doctrine on the written Dia­
logues, coming to the conclusion, since the reports of the Agrapha Dogmata did 
not square with the written Dialogues, that these Doctrines were the pitiable 
products of some decline of Plato's genius into final senility, which had best 
be passed unnoticed. Eduard Zeller, the authoritative late Nineteenth Century 
historian of philosophy, took this view, and in this country the qreat scholar­
ship of Harold F. Cherniss attempted, in important books written in 1944 and 
1945, to save the reputation of Plato by holding that the so-called Unwritten 
Doctrines were really all a colossal misunderstanding and misinterpretation of 
Aristotle, who certainly had a genius for misuderstanding the views of other 
philosophers, and that Plato in fact had no Unwritten Doctrines of any importance, 
and that he could be, and should be, completely studied in the Dialogues alone. 
This opinion had prevailed in strength throughout the long night of analytic 
philosophy in this country and in Europe, and has only been broken in quite 
recent times by the works of Gaiser and Kramer in Germany, and of myself in the 
Anglo-Saxon world. Particular scandal attaches to the fact that Plato in his 
Unwritten Doctrines is said to have identified his Eide with Numbers, an identic 
fication in itself absurd, and then not even with ordinary Natural Numbers, but 
with Numbers of a special eidetic sort which involved no addition of unit to 
unit, and which were begotten by the transcendental intercourse of two generative, 
Pythagorean Principles, Unity itself, an intrinsically equalizing good Principle, 
which imposed limit or definiteness on a second Principle, which was always 
indulging in a bad, blind process of indefinite increase and diminution, limit­
less and bad. Modern analytic philosophers cannot generate Numbers out of an 
intercourse between absolute Unity and endlessly burgeoning multiplicity, and 
must hesitate to attribute such mystical nonsense to the Plato whom they at 
least want to admire. Our suggestion, however, is that Plato's arithmetization
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of the Eide was a sublime, is unsystematic anticipation of the whole of modern 
scientific rationalism, with its stress on unifying patterns and measures, and 
that, in his retention of the countering presence of the Great and Small in all 
things, he also recognized the pervasive presence of an element of inexactitude 
and continuity in all things without which the limiting work of the reasonable 
element in things would be null and void. And, by his introduction of two such 
antithetical Principles, Plato may be held to have made a most interesting 
contribution to Value-theory, in that the Good is seen by him as essentially 
active and causative, and as engaged in an endless task of subordinating the 
intrinsically indefinite and chaotically multiple to predictable order and sim­
plicity. The Principle of Unity and Limit is first at work on the timeless plane 
of the Eide, and gives rise to the endless array of Natural Numbers, of geometrical 
Points, Lines, Surfaces and Solids, and then of Motions which involve an abstractly 
idealized Space and Time, and which point on to Principles of Self-motion or 
Soul, whose type of orderliness can further generate the many-souled orderliness 
of Society. How this whole immense generation of differentiated multiplicity 
out of partless Unity was to have proceeded was never, arguably, for Plato, a 
completely conceived concept, but rather a grandiose project, something that 
the true philosopher would have to elaborate if he were ever to put an end to 
human confusion and wickedness. He did not believe that he himself possessed 
the generative dialectic in question, or that his writings and discourses were 
more than an adumbration of it. The reported Unwritten Doctrines of Plato are 
hard to understand because they were not only unwritten, but not fully formulable 
in the argumentative discourse of the time. They represented an ideal towards 
which the thinker had to work, and of which all theoretical, practical and 
aesthetic endeavors compassed only the beginnings. They were not for Plato a 
finished body of doctrine to which he possessed a perfect key, and it is for 
this reason that the traditions regarding Plato's Unwritten Doctrine are so hard 
to expand and to expound convincingly.
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Plato's progression towards the Unwritten Doctrines may be held to have 
taken place in two steps, which may be called, respectively, the Socratic and 
the Pythagorean illumination. The Socratic illumination represents the turning 
of the dialectic of Socrates into an ontology. Socrates was concerned to arrive 
at Logoi or analytic accounts of the generic natures or meanings common to a 
wide range of specific and individual cases, and particularly to the generic 
natures or meanings peculiar to cases of the moral life: the Just, the Wise,
the Temperate, the Courageous and their opposites. It was possible for these 
natures or meanings to be present unanalysed in a man's character or conduct or 
moral opinions, but a man could only have knowledge of them if he could frame 
definitory accounts of the meanings in question, saying exactly what they covered 
or excluded, in al 1 their applications, and omitting what only applied in some 
of their applications. It also involved arranging these generic meanings in a 
comprehensive pattern, which set forth all their communities and specific dif­
ferences in relation to one another. Socrates recognized the presence of generic 
meanings in other regions than the moral: he had Pythagorean followers who led
him to see them in mathematical fields, and he was not uninterested in the 
speculative conceptions of the physicists. But it was axiological and moral 
conceptions to which his dialectic was principally devoted, since he did not 
believe that one could really live well unless one had clear and certain know­
ledge, not merely fluctuating opinion, of what Goodness in all its species 
really was. Plato applying his genius to the Socratic dialectic turned it into 
an ontology: generic meanings, whether in moral discourse or elsewhere, were
not only real presences in the world through their many species and instances, 
and known and enjoyed iji these, but had a more absolute being than those species 
and instances, and in fact conferred on the latter all the real being that they 
possessed. They were, moreover, not merely apprehended through their species 
and instances, which were often only poor illustrations of them, but rather gave
(5)
their species and instances all the intelligibility of which they were capable.
To generic natures or meanings Plato gave the new name of Eide or Ideas, and 
they were held to be neither general names on men's tongues, nor general 
thoughts in men's minds, but the only entities that could without qualification 
be said to be, and which were further, in some sense, supremely causative, since 
their instances only were what they were by exemplifying them, while they were 
what they were without regard to an exemplifications or instances. While 
essentially able to have instances, they did not need to have any, and in fact 
never had instances that perfectly exemplified or embodied them. Of Eide as so 
depicted Plato held that they were separated by an ontological gulf from all 
their instances, since they were general meanings themselves rather than specific 
cases of these: the Just Itself is the pure essence of Justice, not a specific,
probably imperfect case of Justice. Some modern interpreters have criticized 
Platonism for, as they hold predicating the Eide of the Eide, regarding them as 
perfect instances of themselves, and so merely adding a world of perfect 
exemplars to our world of imperfect ones, which fail to explain anything in our 
imperfect world. Aristotle's criticism of Platonism in the Metaphysics and 
elsewhere made similar objections. But Plato, arguably, never saw the Eide as 
exemplary instances, but as something better than the most exemplary exemplar, 
being the pure essences which, while communicating themselves to their instances 
in varying degrees, were a radically different sort of thing from them. And the 
immense gulf between Eide and instances did not mean that Eide were cut off 
from the cases which 'shared' in them or were 'modelled' upon them, but merely 
that they had a different role, and belonged to a different ontological type, 
being what can be shared in or approached by the character of its instances, 
without itself being an instance of any sort at all. The very terms 'particip­
ation' and 'imitation' were arguably meant by Plato to indicate a very real and 
essential relation which demands, and does not violate, a gulf of type. General
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meanings make a radically different contribution to the world - we may say meta­
phorically - but this does not exclude, but rather requires, that instances 
should be instances of Eide, and that Eide should at least be capable of 
instantiation.
There are many further respects in which Eide had to differ ontologically 
from their instances: they had all to be essentially non-sensuous, however much
present in, and required by their sensuous instances. The qualities of the 
senses varied from occasion to occasion and from person to person, but had to 
have a foundation in pure proportions and numbers which only the pure mind 
could compass non-sensuously. The Eide, further, are essentially unchangeable, 
and out of time altogether, whereas their instances are part of the perpetual 
flux of instantial being, and are constantly coming into being and passing away, 
or being replaced by the instantiation of some other Eidos. Instances, further 
can instantiate conflicting Eide, e.g. unity and multiplicity, in a manner 
impossible at the eidetic level, and instances can be composed out of partial 
instances, and be dissolved into the latter, in a manner in which Eide, while 
permitting differences of aspect and relation, can never be compounded out of, 
nor dissolved into, component Eide, but retain in all relations an essential 
incomposite unity. Instances, further can be many and diverse and widely 
scattered, while the Eide which they instantiate remain wholly single and self­
identical , and indivisible into scattered parts. Location in space involves 
distinctions of instantiation, but not of the Eide which are instantiated.
Eide, further, without loss of identity, must be held to be capable of forms 
of mutual pervasion and communion of which instances are incapable. There are 
generic Eide which run through whole areas of specific Eide which have relations 
of mutual exclusion towards one another: thus being an animal pervades all the
animal species, while these in their turn exclude one another. The Eide there­
fore necessarily form an immense hierarchical system, ranging from the most
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pervasively generic to the most exclusively specific, and dialectic must have 
the task of placing each Eidos in this hierarchy, and relating it to the more 
generic Eide above it, and the more specific Eide beneath it, as well as co­
ordinating it with Eide which stand in neither of these relations to it. Plato's 
later thought concentrated strongly on such hierarchical divisions and collections, 
but it is wrong to suppose that such an arrangement was not implicit in his 
thought from the start, since the very notion of a Logos, is that of saying 
what an Eidos covers and what it excludes, and so giving it a place in a hier­
archy which can be indefinitely extended. Socrates, we may say, was at all times 
giving Eide tentative places in hierarchies, and Plato merely worked out the 
rationale of this whole dialectical procedure.
It is plain finally that the Platonic ontology, which arose out of 
Socraticism, was also from the start not only an ontology, but an axiology: it
implied, though not always plainly stating it, that the prime Eide were pat­
terns of excellence or goodness, and of an intelligibility which could not be 
sharply separated from goodness, and that the bad and the imperfect could only 
be thought of in so far as were excluded by, or declined from a standard of 
perfection. There are countless cases in the Platonic literature where Eide 
of things bad or imperfect are considered, the impiety which is the opposite of 
piety, the injustice which deviates from justice, the distorted forms of the 
human soul or of human societies, the confused motions of the original chaos, 
the absolute Non-being which is the object of Agnosia or Agnoia or what not: 
we even learn that all knowledge is of opposites, and that knowing what an Eidos 
or nature is^ , involves knowing all the Eide or natures which deviate from it, 
either absolutely or with varying degrees of remoteness. This axiological 
aspect of the Eide made it natural for Plato to make all the Eide specific 
forms of the Good, and if, in the Phaedo, he sees it as the supreme task of
the physicist to determine how and why certain natural arrangements are good.
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he also opines in the same dialogue that the Eide are the true causes of anything 
being as it is, the Eide being therefore given an essentially axiological sig­
nificance. In the Academy, we are told by the commentators, it was early held 
that there cannot be Eide of everything, not, e.g. of things evil or negative 
or changeable or accidental or partial, or hybrid or compound, or artificially 
constructed, or due to choice or chance, but only of perfect substances and 
their essential excellence. The practice of Plato in seeming to give eidetic 
status to perversions and distortions, and to structures as artificial as a 
bed, is best seen as springing from an axiology deeper then the ordinary, one 
that sees the absolutely good as being as essentially revealed in what negates 
it, or deviates from it, as in what perfectly exemplifies it: in excluding
what deviates from the well-formed and intelligible, the Absolutely Good in a 
manner includes the former. To know what is the good form of anything is to 
know what is not its good form. The placing of the Good at the apex of the 
eidetic hierarchy likewise exemplies the union of ontology with axiology. The 
intelligible forms of things are the good forms of them, and we understand the 
dark and confused through their departure from the luminous and perspicuous.
The Good, however, being the pervasive spirit of the whole eidetic hierarchy, 
and all deviations from it, must necessarily transcend the well-formed, intel­
ligible being of the Eide: being the very Principle of Good Form, it cannot
be seen as merely a particular case, however exalted, of the well-formed. The 
mysticism of the Platonic approach to the Absolute Good, its transcendence of 
being and definitional knowledge, a mysticism also present in Plato's magnificent 
Second Epistle, is a profoundly rational mysticism: it merely recognizes that
a Principle cannot, except by an impermissible of understandable extension, be 
ranged alongside of its applications.
I do not, however, wish to remain further absorbed in Plato's first great
illumination, how ontological-axiological restatement of Socraticism. I wish
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to pass to his second great illumination which never received full written 
expression, though his writings, on my view, contain hints at it at countless 
points. This was his Pythagorean!zation of the Eide, his arithmetization of 
them, and his reduction of all natures to numerical structures and relations, 
which are not, however the numbers of our ordinary computations. It will be 
this second illumination with which I shall be concerned in the remainder of 
my paper.
On my view there was nothing that speaks of lateness or decline in Plato1 
second great illumination: it must have occurred when Plato made his first
visit to Sicily and Southern Italy in 388-7 B.C. He then arrived at the view 
that the eidetic ontology into which he had transformed the ethical dialectic 
of Socrates demanded a further transformation into a Pythagorean ontology, in 
which Eide would be reduced to arithmetical patterns, and relations of Eide to 
a derivation of all complex, many-dimensioned patterns and operations from 
some absolutely simple and basic ones. After a fashion, we may say that Plato 
was led by the Italian Pythagoreans with whom he consorted to aspire to a 
comprehensive philosophy of mathematics, of which the modern works of Frege 
and Russell are in some respects fuller elaborations, though they do not 
attempt to cover the whole territory of deductive science as Plato did.
Plato's arithmetization of the Eide was a natural development of his 
belief in their absolute non-sensuousness. The qualities of the senses vary 
from moment to moment and person to person, and their relations cannot be 
rendered perspicuous as those of numbers can. The generation of all numbers 
from a principle of primal Unity, successively imposing itself on a principle 
of indefinite continuity, was at least an inspiring enterprise, and could per­
haps be extended to cover the complexities of nature and human society as 
one could not hope to derive the latter from the Hot and the Cold, the Moist 
and the Dry, and other sensuous differences. Aristotle was wholly unclear as
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to what Plato's identification of the Eide with numbers could possibly mean, 
and from Aristotle the perplexity has spread to most later thinkers. Does 
Plato mean that an Eidos like that of a Horse is to be identified with a 
Natural Number such as Eight? This is obviously fantastic. Or does it mean 
that the essences of everything are ratios of numbers, as Empedocles taught of 
the proportions of the elements which make up bone? If this is so, of what 
elements are they the ratios? And how does Plato propose to educe Lines,
Figures and Solids, which come after the Natural Numbers, to Numbers? Will 
they involve other non-numerical principles? And how can anyone explain the 
Decad? Obviously one cannot allot Numbers to everything if one has only ten 
Numbers. It seem obvious, however, that Plato could not have meant by his 
universal arithmetization an identification of each Eidos with a Natural 
Number or a ratio of such Numbers: he can at best have meant that the essence
of everything, and of whatever was good in it, could be stated in a complex set 
of numerical ratios and relationships, a view by no means absurd. What is the 
face of Mona Lisa, and its beauty, but a complex pattern of such ratios? And 
obviously the varying dimensions of space can be covered by extensions of the 
Number system in new directions, as has in fact been done in the Complex Numbers 
of modern mathematics. Plato would seem to have thought of Lines as continuous 
or flowing Numbers determined by two limiting points, surfaces as products of 
at least two numbers fixed by at least three points, and solids as products of 
three numbers fixed between at least four points. If we know that the generation 
of such dimensions requires more resources than Plato disposed of, he at least 
made a beginning in the right direction. And his restriction of all Numbers to 
the Decadcannot have meant a restriction of all essences to the first ten Natural 
Numbers, but rather a limitation of the types of numerical complexity that are 
reflected in the dimensions of Space. The Decad 10 is the sum of 1+2+3+4, and 
hence is the Principle of all the Natural Numbers, all the one-dimensional Lines,
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all the two-dimensional surfaces and all the three-dimensional solids, and so 
covers in a sense all Numbers. These identifications of numerical dimension 
could be extended to cover motions in time, and so could further be applied to 
Souls which are in Platonism the ultimate sources of all motion, and are further 
explicable in terms of the numerical patterns they inwardly understand and can 
impose on the movements of bodies.
Aristotle tells us that Plato believed in two classes of Numbers, the 
eidetic Numbers and the mathematical Numbers. The eidetic Numbers were each 
unique and single, whereas their mathematical correlates were numerous: there
was only one eidetic Three, very Threeness itself, but there were infinitely 
many mathematical threes. One can in mathematics say that a three added to a 
three together make a six. Mathematical Numbers resemble Eide in being eternal 
and non-sensuous, but they resemble instances in being many alike: they are as
it were ideal instances, intermediate between Eide and sensible instances, and 
for this reason are well illustrated by the latter, as Plato says in the Republic. 
Mathematical Numbers can be added to one another, or subtracted from one another, 
to yield other mathematical Numbers, but their eidetic originals are neither 
addible or subtractible. Fiveness does not consist of Threeness plus Twoness, 
nor does Threeness consist of Fiveness minus Twoness. Eidetic Numbers are in 
fact wholly incomposite: they have the profound unity of each and all of the
Eide. Aristotle finds this all quite unintelligible. How can there be a Three 
itself which does not consist of three units or of a single unit plus a couple? 
Plato would answer that eidetic Threeness is not a case of Threeness, but Three­
ness itself, the Threeness in which all triads participate but whose unity they 
cannot share. Aristotle is then forced to the fantastic view that each eidetic 
Number must consist of units peculiar to itself, but an eidetic Number can have 
no constituents. Plato further applies the notion of intermediate mathematicals 
to Lines, Figures and Solids as well as Numbers. There are many geometrical
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Straight Lines, Triangles and Cubes but only a single Eidos of the Line, the 
Triangle and the Cube as such. Here again we have ideal instantiations in a 
position half way between Eide and sensuous instances. And there are motions 
in the dynamic problems of pure astronomers which are neither the motions of 
actual bodies nor the eidetic types of motion which are ideally instantiated 
in such problems.
The doctrine of the mathematical intermediaries is never clearly stated 
in the Republic, but is hinted at again and again: such intermediaries are
plainly needed to provide peculiar objects for dianoetic thought, though Plato 
says it would be too complex to detail such objects, (See 516a, 525b, 526a, 534b). 
Just as there are shadows and reflections which correspond to the solid meas­
urable realities of reliable perception, so there have to be upper-world shadows 
and reflections of eidetic patterns, and these can be none other than the Objects 
of Mathematics. And Mathematics leads on to the upper-world, dialectical study 
of the Eide, precisely because it introduces us to well-formed, timeless images 
of the Eide even if these happen to be many alike. And Mathematics works on 
hypotheses, since it takes for granted the being of the eidetic essences which 
its multiple images exemplify, whereas Dialectic derives them all from a non- 
hypothetical first Principle of Absolute Unity or Goodness, which transcends all 
the mathematical Eide, and all their ideal and sensuous instances, by being their 
unquestioned, unhypothetical first principle. The hypotheses of which Plato 
speaks are, we may note, positings of entities or concepts, not assertions of 
propositions.
Plato also took over from the Pythagoreans, we learn from Aristotle and 
from other sources, a systematic 'generation' of all the eidetic Numbers, and 
of the geometrical entities which come 'after' them, by the repeated interaction 
of two Principles, both plainly Pythagorean. One of these Principles was that 
of Unity or the Good, which set definite bounds to quantitative variation in any
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direction, and was plainly the same as the Pythagorean Principle of the Peras 
or Limit, while the other Principle was the 'bad' Principle of the Continuum, 
which Plato called, not the Infinite or the Indefinite, as the Pythagoreans 
did, but the Great and (the) Small, or the Indefinite Dyad. Aristotle thought 
that Plato meant to introduce two Principles in place of the one Pythagorean 
Principle of the Infinite or Indefinite (Apeiron), but this is obviously not 
the case. The Great and Small is simply the Principle of Indefinite Quantity, 
of what can be increased or decreased indefinitely, and which nowhere has fixed 
boundaries. The Greeks, like ourselves, were fascinated by the continuity of 
space and time, and by their reflection in numerical fractions and ratios, and 
by the sheer impossibility of setting final bounds to them in either direction. 
The basic form of the Great and Small was the Many and Few, the raw material, as 
it were, for the Natural Numbers. It had a sub-species called the Long and 
Short which provided the raw material for Lines, a sub-species called the Broad 
and Narrow which, together with the Long and Short, provided the raw material 
for Surfaces and Figures, and a sub-species called the Deep and Shallow which, 
together with the two previous species, provided the raw material for Solid 
Figures. It seems possible, from what Plato says in the Republic, that Plato 
recognized a further form of the Great and Small which made motion possible: 
this was the Swift and the Slow which underlies the velocities in which astron­
omers are interested. Regular motions always reflect the action of the One 
setting bounds to the irregularities due to the Great and Small. All this gen­
eration of the Eide by the imposition of Unity on the Great and Small was not 
meant to take place successively in time, but to be essentially timeless. Talk 
of generation with its temporal suggestions is only for expository purposes, 
though Aristotle is disposed to take it literally.
The percise nature of the generation is very obscure, and has had to be
filled in at many points by such interpretations as those of Robin, Stenzel and
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Ross. In the case of the integers Plato did not generate them in their natural 
order by the addition of a unity to its predecessor: he preferred to proceed 
by multiplication and intercalation. An integral number is conceived as a 
multiplicative power. Two doubles. Three triples, and so on, and hence all 
factorizable Numbers can be obtained by multiplying Numbers by themselves or 
by other Numbers, e.g. Nine is thrice Three etc. The Prime Numbers then give 
rise to a problem: how are they to be generated? Plato, on Robin's interpret­
ation, seems to have imagined by a process of splitting the distance between 
two factorizable Numbers, dividing it into two equal segments. The Number Two 
has a unique origin: the obscure tendency to increase and decrease being so
limited that we have a precise doubling Unity. This being granted, self­
multiplication yields all the powers of Two. Three then arise by an equal 
division of the interval between Two and Four, and we now dispose of all the 
products of Two and Three. We can now generate Five by splitting the difference 
between Four and Six and so on. Multiplications and splitting of differences 
thus yield all the Natural Numbers, and fractions can be generated in similar 
ways. I am not sure how much I understand of all these timeless processes: 
obviously they prompt many questions. Further generations are very obscure 
and would seem to have involved some sort of timeless ideal fluxion. Sextus 
Empiricus, in this attack on the metaphysical mathematicians, among whom Plato 
is plainly to be included, says that 'some say that Body arose from a single 
point whose flux produced a Line, whose flux in its turn produced a Surface, 
and, when this moved into depth, three-dimensional Body was generated. Sol id 
bodies were thus constructed under the hegemony of Number. And from them lastly 
sensible things arose, Earth and Water and Air and Fire and the cosmos as a 
whole'. Regular motion is a further product of this generative process, and a 
final product is the Soul, the principle of living motion and thought. Aristotle 
says in De Anima 404b 'In the same way Plato in the Timaeus, makes the Soul out
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of the elements. For like is known by like, and things arise from their Prin­
ciples. In the way in Plato's discourse On Philosophy it was laid down that 
the Living Creature Itself came from the Idea of Unity Itself with the first 
Length, Breadth and Depth, and other things in similar fashion. And in yet an­
other fashion they make Intuitive Mind (Nous) be the One, Knowledge the Dyad, 
since it proceeds in a single line to one point, Opinion the number of the Sur­
face, and Sensation the number of the Solid. Things are judged by Intuition, 
Knowledge, Opinion and Sensation, and these Numbers are the Eide of things.
It will be plain from these citations that Plato's identification of the Eide 
with Numbers, and their generation by the intercourse of Unity with the Great 
and Small, was an immensely complex theoretical construction, which Plato hoped 
to see worked out by the labours of many insightful philosophers, and not at all 
presently compassed by himself. We have now to say some words in assessment of 
this grandiose project which has been so little considered by the interpreters 
of Plato’s dialogues. On our view Plato's mature thought in the Phaedo,
Republic. Symposium, Phaedrus, Parmenides etc. cannot be properly understood 
without an understanding of the Unwritten Doctrines. They became an aspiration 
of Plato, not at a late, but at a quite early stage of his development. All 
Platonism and Neoplatonism and their many mediaeval offshoots show traces of 
the doctrine that they were unable to interpret and develop satisfactorily.
The reduction of all natures of things, and all values and excellences, 
to complexes of Numbers is of course somewhat strange to the modern philosopher, 
who is inclined to stress the irreducibility of what is qualitative. Science 
may have reduced all colours, sounds, etc. to differences in wave-length and 
frequency etc., but the philosopher is disposed to see something irreducible 
and irremoveable in the passage from mere quantity to quality, and vice versa. 
And all our aesthetic responses to the world and its contents seem to depend 
in great part on differences that are qualitative, and not merely quantitative.
The importance of measure and proportion as underlying beauty and moral goodness
( 16)
was, however, deeply Hellenic: both Aristotle's Ethics and Plato's Philebus
express this. And after all, what makes an animal be a tiger or a musk-ox or 
an elephant can be nothing but its characteristic shape and size and proportions, 
all of which coni sist in ratios and measures. And the beauty of a face is 
plainly a matter of measure: thicken the mouth or lengthen the nose or distance 
the eyes a little, and it may be replaced by ugliness. And the regular motions 
of sun, moon, stars and planets, which to us are uninteresting, were to antiquity 
the very type of the beautiful and orderly. Such harmony is also in immortal 
souls, and obviously notions of due proportion and equalization enter into the 
virtues of Temperance, Courage and Justice, and into the practical Wisdom that 
presides over them all. The Platonic Republic was moreover run entirely on 
Numbers, the times and frequencies of pairings for the various classes of the 
citizens being decided by them, and a healthy, virtuous society would become 
a corrupt, evil society if such Numbers were disregarded. Plato had no experience 
of the ugliness and wretchedness of a computer-run society, or one with only a 
limited number of uniform products: it was understandable that he should see
health and beauty and truth and virtue in men and societies dominated by the 
mathematical equation. Plato, however, like Aristotle, recognized the necessary 
presence of the element of the inexact, approximate, indefinite, continuous, 
ever burgeoning and ever shriking element, in thought and reality, so that the 
mathematization of all eidetic thought-patterns does not mean that exactness 
and arithmetical simplicity will carry the day in all cases, and that all deviations 
from this will be signs of depravity. For Platonism believes that, not only all 
instantia! existence, but also the eidetic paradigms that they copy or share in, 
involve an element of the indefinite and inexact on which the limits of goodness 
and precise measure are imposed. Even in the realm of the Eide we have a proto­
type of Space and Time, the media of instantiation: Arithmetic arises when the
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Many and Few are bounded by Absolute Unity, Linear Geometry when the Long and 
the Short are thus bounded, Plane Geometry when the Long and Short and Broad
and Narrow are thus bounded, and Solid Geometry when the limitation is extended 
to the Deep and Shallow. Time then becomes rhythmic and beautiful, and a moving 
image of eternity, when the disorderly flux of primeval being becomes a matter 
of fixed tracks and invariant velocity such as we see in the heavens. All this 
domination of the Great and Small by Absolute Unity is not only carried out in 
the sensible Cosmos by the Demiugic Mind, but more perfectly and timelessly in 
the realm of the Eide, for they too exhibit the indefinite dominated by the 
Definite. If all things are reflected upon, we can make sense of Plato's eidetic 
Republic as an Eidos laid up in heaven, representing a perfect ordering of all 
physical and psychic patterns in a single community, the most glorious triumph 
of Unity over the Great and Small. The Christian Kingdom of Heaven is an Eidos 
having much the same coverage as the eidetic Republic of Plato, and we may well 
hold that Christianity merely added a few complements and corrections to Plato's 
idea of the perfect society. Seen in these lights, Plato's mathematicization of 
the Eide need not be nigglingly precise: there are branches of mathematics that
deal with the inexact and probabilistic and topological, and arguably these are 
as fundamental as those which are rigorously exact. I do not suggest that Plato 
foresaw the existence of topology. I shall not continue my discourse further: 
you can pursue the matter in my two books, and in those of Gaiser and Kramer.
I shall be content if I have led you to turn your backs on the view of Plato's 
Unwritten Doctrines as a senile aberration of Plato, or as a gross misinterpret­
ation of Aristotle, or as academic garbage which accumulated in the early 
Academy. I would also suggest that, not only the Republic, but also the 
Parmenides shows the continuous influence of the Unwritten Doctrines. The 
Absolutely Good is there identified with a Unity which is in one perspective 
beyond all definite numerical and other determinations, while in another
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perspective permitting the derivation of all such determinations from itself, 
and which is opposed by a principle of the Indefinite which, if we try to isolate 
it, has just such an ever elusive shiftingness of content as we take the Great 
and Small to have. Hypothesis VII in particular is a wonderful picture of the 
Great and Small, which is always ready to dissolve into a multitude of distinct 
units, liable to indefinite further dissolution. If one wants to see a sort of 
existentialism in Plato, here one has it, but the serene profile of Absolute 
Unity remains above undisturbed. And in the world of the Eide the forces of 
division and gross expansion are always perfectly under control, even if, in 
the world of instances, everything always exceeds or falls short. And Plato is 
seen not to be a dualist. For the expansion of the Eide into the realm of 
instantiation is seen not to be an inexplicable fall, but a carrying further of 
the domination of multiplicity and detail which is already present at the eidetic 
level. A Neoplatonist like Proel us worked the whole mystery out: the One must
go forth from itself into endless specification and instantiation in order to 
return to itself eternally and, so to be the One. And these thoughts also 
underlie the Dialectic of Hegel, for whom the Absolute Idea is the eternal 
vision of itself in its Other. Hegel must have derived this conception from 
the Parmenides of Plato, and so ultimately from Plato's Unwritten Doctrines.
The best of philosophy is therefore, to imitate an apophthegm of Whitehead's, 
only a postscript to Plato.
J. N. Findlay 
Boston University
